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Abstract Food production, water management, land use,
and animal and public health are all topics of extensive
public debate. These themes are linked to the core activities
of the agricultural sector, and more specifically to the work
of farmers. Nonetheless, the ethical discussions are mostly
initiated by interest groups in society rather than by
farmers. At least in Europe, consumer organizations and
animal welfare and environmental organizations are more
present in the public debate than farmers. This is not how it
should be. First, because consumers often cannot but rely
on agriculture. Second, because recent research shows that
farmers have moral beliefs and convictions that appear to
be broader than economic considerations and that are—to a
certain extent—specific to their profession. This raises the
question how to make input from farmers operational in the
public debates on the future of farming. We discuss one
option: entrusting farmers with professional autonomy
concerning moral matters related to farming. We sketch the
historical background of the current situation in which
farmers are relatively silent on moral matters and we pre-
sent some clear indications that farmers have values and
moral beliefs that are relevant for the public debate. Next
the concepts of professionalism and professional autonomy
are discussed and applied to the practice of farming.
Finally, we discuss the relevance and limits of professional
moral autonomy for the agricultural profession. We close
with an overview of what this moral autonomy implies for
and requires from farmers in practice. We conclude that if
some preconditions are met by farmers, then this type of
moral autonomy can be relevant for farmers and for soci-
ety, and contributes to the quality of the public debate on
the future of farming.
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Introduction
Food production, water management, land use, and animal
and public health are all topics of extensive public debate.
These themes are of great relevance for the core activities
of the agricultural and food sector, and more specifically to
the work of farmers. At least in Europe however consumer
organizations, animal welfare organizations and environ-
mental organizations are more present in the public debate
than the farmers themselves. These interest groups initiate
the ethical discussions, rather than the farmers.
The public debate on animal welfare can illustrate this
point. Since publications such as Ruth Harrison’s Animal
Machines (1964) and the subsequent studies on animal
welfare, such as the well-known report by the Brambell
committee (1965), animal welfare has become a subject of
public debate. In this debate farmers tended to focus on the
technical, rather than on the ethical side of the matter (e.g.,
Te Velde et al. 2002; Fraser et al. 1997). They discussed
the empirical question whether the welfare of the farm
animals was indeed harmed—which implicitly recognizes
the prima facie wrongness of harming animals. However,
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they often missed the more profound discussions on the
moral position of animals and the future of animal pro-
duction. As a result, in many European societies other
stakeholders started to reflect on what is ‘‘right’’ with
respect to animal welfare. These groups do not deny the
role of farmers with regard to animal welfare, but they do
not consider them to be competent partners in the ethical
debate on animal welfare. This is a lamentable situation,
for a number of reasons.
First, the absence of farmers in the public debate is a
fundamental problem. Access to and opportunity to influ-
ence the public debate are essential preconditions for a
well-operating public discourse (cf. Habermas 1990; Van
Mill 1996). Therefore, as citizens and as stakeholders,
farmers should have the opportunity to function as full
partners in the public debates on issues of agriculture and
food production.
Second, the increasing distance in time and space
between consumer and farmer entails that consumers are
less familiar with agricultural activities and processes
(Lang 1999; Mcelwee and Annibal 2010). Consequently,
consumers have to rely on farmers in many matters of
agriculture because they lack the expertise and time to
control all activities in the agro-food sector (Brom 2000;
Meijboom 2008). Society needs the involvement of the
agricultural sector. At a minimum level, it is necessary in
order to provide input for policy and laws that regulate the
activities of farming. Beyond that society can benefit even
more from the input from farmers, because of the following
two reasons.
Third, we see clear indications that farmers have moral
beliefs and values that enable them to contribute to the
public debate in a relevant way. Farmers are often con-
sidered to lack an independent and contributive view
because they are looked upon as being primarily econom-
ically driven. Even though we do not deny that economic
continuity of the farm is a major concern for farmers,
recent research shows that this ‘‘economy only’’ view is a
caricature (De Rooij et al. 2010; De Lauwere and De Rooij
2010; Driessen 2012, 2014; Grimm 2010; Cardoso and
James 2012). Farmers have moral beliefs and convictions
beyond economic considerations. Even stronger, they can
contribute to the debate in a way that is—to a certain
extent—specific to farmers. On the one hand, they have
moral beliefs that others may not bring into the debate,
such as notions of caregiving and pride, and moral ideals
on good farming (De Rooij et al. 2010; De Lauwere and De
Rooij 2010). On the other hand, farmers’ contribution can
be special because of their hands-on experience in dealing
with the ethical questions and problems in agriculture. If
these views, beliefs and experiences are not utilized, it is a
loss for the quality of the public debate.
Fourth, even though farmers still are no frontrunners in
moral discussions, recent initiatives show that they are
willing to deal with ethical and societal issues. For
instance, in the Netherlands and in Belgium some big
breeding cooperatives and national farmers’ associations
established their own ethical committees (e.g., De Weerd
et al. 2012). In their public communication too, farmers
associations start to include ethical issues such as animal
welfare, food safety, and sustainability (e.g., Boerenbond
2010; ZLTO 2009; Deutschen Bauernverbandes 2011).
In sum, farmers should and can have a voice in the
public debate. And they increasingly do, or at least try to
contribute to the public debate on ethical issues related to
the future of the agriculture and food. Furthermore, society
needs the input from farmers because consumers are less
familiar with agricultural activities and processes. This
raises the question how to use this input from farmers to
secure their voice in the public debate and to improve the
quality of the public debate on the future of farming. In this
article, we discuss one option: entrusting farmers with
professional autonomy concerning moral matters. This
proposal implies that farmers are entrusted by society with
certain levels of professional freedom to deal with ethical
questions and problems related to (animal) farming. We
aim to answer two related questions: (a) Is entrusting
professional autonomy concerning ethical issues helpful to
enable farmers to play a more constructive role in public
debates on the future of farming? And if so, (b) Do farmers
fulfill the conditions to be entrusted by society with such
autonomy?
In the next section, we analyze some changes in agri-
culture during the last century in order to understand why
farmers currently play a modest role in public debates.
Changes in agriculture and the influence
on farmers’ autonomy
Traditionally, European farmers have been entrepreneurs or
tenants who highly value the possession of land and animals,
because this is related to independent entrepreneurship (cf.
Schoon and Te Grotenhuis 2000). Also, they were relatively
independent in their choices how to run their farms. There
was only little interference from outside. In other words,
traditionally farmers have been relatively independent and
largely autonomous entrepreneurs.
This situation, however, changed during the last century
and especially since World War II. Food security became
an important public goal. All developments in agriculture
started to focus on the production of sufficient safe food for
all citizens of Europe. To pursue this public goal, gov-
ernments established food and nutrition policies and
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programs in order to combine and improve the individual
capacities of farmers to guarantee food security (cf. Lang
1999, 2010; Knutson et al. 1998). However, this ‘‘sys-
tematic effort to tackle the age-old challenges such as
hunger and production shortages’’ directly interfered in the
daily practice of farmers (Lang 1999, p. 336). The aim to
increase food production as rapidly as possible resulted in a
new paradigm for agricultural production, characterized by
up-scaling, increasing productivity, and rationalization of
the production process (Waltner-Toews and Lang 2000,
p. 117). Consequently, ‘‘agriculture has grown from a
primary basic sector of the economy to a secondary tech-
nical sector with complex joint interactions with the rest of
the economy’’ (Kunkel 1984, p. 21).
For European farmers this meant that they could no
longer operate on an individual basis, but had to comply
with the broader national and European legal, political and
economic context. The constraints created by the ‘‘new
economic environment of farming limit what options a
farmer has available to him’’ (Hendrickson and James
2005, p. 270). Many farmers were unable to meet the new
technical, political and economic demands and had to quit.
This resulted in a gradual and irreversible decrease in the
number of agricultural holdings (Eurostat 2010). Those
who are still in business focus on raising production and
increasing productivity. Consequently, the overall produc-
tivity in Europe has not decreased in spite of the reduction
of farms (Eurostat 2010). In the US the agricultural sector
retained a strong economic position (cf. Knutson et al.
1998). In Europe, however, ‘‘partly due to its fragmented
agricultural sector’’, the sector never gained such a central
position (Lang 1999, p. 339). Citizens and consumers are
less familiar with agricultural activities and processes and
the distance between farm and fork kept increasing (Brom
et al. 2007). This ‘‘marginalization process of agriculture in
society’’ (Mcelwee and Annibal 2010, p. 488) and the
concomitant lack of control also meant that citizens and
consumers had to rely more on the expertise and compe-
tence of farmers. The individual farmer in Europe however
was not entrusted with this task; rather, he was increasingly
confronted with a loss of his traditional independence and
autonomy. Farmers still considered themselves as inde-
pendent entrepreneurs, yet there was ‘‘less room for
maneuver due to asphyxiating regulatory schemes (partly
imposed by food empires, partly by state agencies)’’ (Van
der Ploeg 2010, p. 104; cf. Hendrickson and James 2005).
Initially, this situation turned out to be rather unproblem-
atic for most partners in the sector, farmers included. This,
however, changed as a result of a further development. By the
end of the last century, when food security was guaranteed in
Europe, the exclusive focus on increasing food production
was severely questioned by several groups in society. Agri-
cultural production was no longer only evaluated in terms of
output and production, but also in terms of animal welfare,
social justice and climate change (cf. Mepham et al. 1995;
Brom 2000; Korthals 2004; Gottwald et al. 2010). Publica-
tions such as the above-mentioned ‘‘Animal Machines’’
(Harrison 1964), but also ‘‘Animal Liberation’’ mark the start
of a sharp criticism of farming in general and especially of the
intensive use of animals. Even though the central task of
agriculture is still foodproduction, a ‘‘transition to agricultural
sustainability’’ is considered as essential for the future of
agriculture (Ruttan 1999, p. 5960). Consequently, rather than
only technical and economic aspects of (animal) farming, a
broader range ofmoral dimensions have become central in the
public debates on sustainable food production and the future
of animal farming. For instance, it suddenly was stressed that
the very efficient and intensified way of farming that first was
considered to be the best way to develop for agriculture, had
become ‘‘a major contributor to environmental problems,
including greenhouse gas emissions’’ (Van der Ploeg 2010,
p. 100).
To adjust to this shift in focus turned out to be prob-
lematic for farmers, which resulted in a modest role in
public debates on these societal issues. We argue that this
is not the result of indifference, but should be understood in
the light of the above-described developments in the agri-
cultural sector. Traditionally farmers have a broad range of
moral values and beliefs (Thompson 2013; Rollin 2004).
However, the industrialization of agriculture appealed
mainly to the role of farmers as entrepreneur and as tech-
nical expert, rather than as a stakeholder who discusses
value-laden aspects of agriculture in a public arena. Con-
sequently, farmers still had their traditional values, such as
stewardship, care, pride, and responsibility. But there was
no direct need to introduce them in the public realm, nor
was there an incentive to further develop their professional
moral framework in the light of the new developments.
Hence, when from the 1970s onwards, other stakeholders
challenged farmers, farmers lacked experience in ethical
debating and in translating their traditional values into the
public realm. As a consequence, they were hesitant to
introduce their moral beliefs as input for public debates.
This hesitance and their concern for the continuity of their
farm and the economic pressure under which they have to
operate, led to a situation in which farmers often are not
considered as full partners in an ethical discussion. They
are regularly accused of being ‘‘motivated purely by profit,
not by any compassion for animals or the traditional ethic
of animal care’’ (Fraser 2001, p. 636). Such accusations
make farmers even more hesitant to enter the ethical dis-
cussion. In surveys, farmers mention that they experience a
gap between them and the rest of society. They feel that
‘‘their farming practice, stimulated by years of agricultural
policy, is rejected now’’ (Schoon and Te Grotenhuis 2000,
p. 22).
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In summary, the brief overview of the developments in
farming during the last century indicates a mismatch
between farmers’ traditional values and the modern ethical
questions. This explains the loss of ‘‘voice’’ of farmers in
public debates on ethical issues such as animal welfare,
water management, public health or food quality. Fur-
thermore, the mismatch between farmers and society has an
impact on the autonomy of farmers. The traditional con-
ceptions no longer suffice, and, as Rollin (2004, p. 955)
accurately argues, ‘‘professions must stay in accord with
social ethics, or risk losing their autonomy’’.
Following recent research on farmers’ value assump-
tions and ethical frameworks (De Rooij et al. 2010; De
Lauwere and De Rooij 2010; Cardoso and James 2012;
Driessen 2014; Stafleu et al. 2004), we argue that farmers
can (and more often do) stay in accord with social ethics
and that their (traditional) set of values and beliefs can be
of added value to the public debate. This, however, sup-
poses that (a) farmers act as professionals and that (b) so-
ciety acknowledges them as full partners with regard to
ethical issues. With this latter point, it is important to note
that in spite of the ‘‘increasingly urbanized world the rural
has not only refused to ‘fade away’ but has found voice in
interesting and to some extent unexpected ways’’
(McDonagh 2013, p. 715). In this paper, we will focus on
the first precondition. Therefore, the next section discusses
the concepts of profession and professionals.
Professionals, autonomy and morality
The autonomy of farmers concerning moral matters that we
focus on in this paper is part of a broader discussion on the
autonomy of agents in their role as professionals. Already
in the 1950s it has been analyzed that work becomes an
occupation and some occupations become professions
(Evetts and Buchner-Jeziorska 1997, p. 239). Traditionally
only medicine and law were seen as true examples of
professions. However, currently there is an ‘‘increased use
[of profession and professionalism] in all work contexts’’
(Evetts 2003, p. 396). Not only physicians and lawyers are
seen as professionals, but also other occupational groups
have become professionals, such as those working in the IT
sector or journalists.
In practice it is not that easy to distinguish professions
from occupational groups. According to the definition of
Parsons, a profession is ‘‘a cluster of ‘occupational’ roles,
that is, roles in which the incumbents perform certain
functions valued in the society in general, and by these
activities, typically ‘earn a living’ at a ‘fulltime job’’’
(Parsons 1954, p. 372). From this perspective many occu-
pations can be considered as professions. Consequently,
Wilensky (1964) even wondered whether we could speak
of the professionalization of virtually everyone. In reply to
this, many authors try to be more specific and identify
additional essential elements in order to define a profes-
sion, such as education, a legal standing, an internal
organization, and an ethical code (Abbott 1988; Dingwall
and Lewis 1983; Evetts 2003; Wilensky 1964). In spite of
the relevance of these criteria, we agree with Evetts, who
follows Hughes (1958) in saying that the differences
between professions and occupations are differences of
degree rather than of kind (Evetts 2003, p. 397).
Traditionally, expertise and knowledge are considered
to be the constitutive elements of a profession. This
explains the special position of professions in society.
Members of a profession have knowledge and skills with
respect to a certain practice that others in society lack. As a
result, these (lay) persons have to rely on or trust profes-
sional workers in their daily life. This reliance does not
imply that the actions of professionals are beyond discus-
sion. Professionals have faced genuine criticism during the
last decades. The expert judgments of professionals such as
medical doctors, lawyers, or scientist have been questioned
(Illich 1977). This shows that the fact that ‘‘some profes-
sionals are rewarded with authority, privileged rewards and
higher status’’ (Evetts 2006, p. 132) is not unconditional
and not based on their expert knowledge alone. As Evetts
claims, ‘‘professionalism requires professionals to be
worthy of that trust, to maintain confidentiality and not use
their knowledge for evil purposes’’ (2006, p. 132; 2003,
p. 400). If and only if these conditions are met, another
related concept surfaces: professional autonomy.
Professional autonomy is historically considered to be the
right to ‘‘determine work activity on the basis of professional
judgment’’. This right is granted through public acceptance of
the profession’s claims with respect to their expertise and
service orientation (Haug and Sussman 1969, p. 153). Rollin
describes it as a situation in which society says: ‘‘You regu-
late yourselves the way we would regulate you if we under-
stood what you do, which we don’t. But we will know if you
don’t self-regulate properly and then we will regulate you,
despite our lack of understanding’’ (Rollin 2004, p. 955). In
practice, this professional self-regulation implies at least that
an individual professional is free to make his or her own
judgment. For instance, that a journalist can do her work
without direct political constraints or that a physician has the
freedom to choose the treatment she considers most appro-
priate based on her professional judgment. In this sense
professional autonomy is a minimal condition to function as a
professional; it is also a necessary condition if people are to
rely on the professional. As Bayles rightly argues, ‘‘if pro-
fessionals did not exercise their judgment in these aspects,
people would have little reason to hire them’’ (1988, p. 28).
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Furthermore, professional autonomy is related to ethical
issues (cf. Beauchamp and Childress 2001). This entails
certain levels of freedom to deal with ethical issues that are
related to the profession, such as end of life decisions by
physicians, or dealing with questions of privacy by jour-
nalists. This, however, supposes more than mere knowl-
edge and experience. In his analysis of professionalism,
Carr (1999) provides a list of criteria that pays explicit
attention to the ethical aspects of professions:
(i) Professions provide an important public service;
(ii) They involve a theoretical as well as practical
grounded expertise; (iii) they have a distinct ethical
dimension which calls for expression in a code of
practice; (iv) they require organization and regulation
for purposes of recruitment and discipline; (v) pro-
fessionals require a high degree of individual auton-
omy—independence of judgment—for effective
practice. (p. 34)
According to Carr a profession is intrinsically linked to a
public service that has an ethical dimension and touches
upon basic rights (1999, p. 37), for example the right to life
in the case of medical doctors or the right to liberty and
freedom in the case of lawyers. Professionals, in Carr’s
sense, deal in their daily practice with ethical questions and
as such play an important role in addressing these
questions. Consequently, a professional needs moral com-
petence. That competence should include more than
obeying the ethical code or code of that profession. The
‘‘precise codification or systematization of professional
ethics’’ is important, but there still is an obligation for the
professional to make his own moral judgment rather than
‘‘accept merely at the bidding of others’’ (Carr 1999, p. 45).
If the moral competence of the professional is perceived in
this broader sense, professionals can play an active role in
dealing with the ethical questions of their professional
practice. This makes the claim by Dingwall and Lewis
(1983, p. 5) more plausible that ‘‘professions and occupa-
tions presume to tell the rest of their society what is good
and right for it, but also they determine the ways of
thinking about problems which fall in their domain’’. The
ability to tell what is good and right is not merely based on
knowledge and technical competence, but should also be
based on the professionals’ moral competence and
expertise.
Carr’s claim that professions are intrinsically linked to a
public service with an ethical dimension is of direct
influence on the discussion on professional autonomy. For
professionals,
(a) whose profession includes a public service that has
an ethical dimension and
(b) who have the moral competence and expertise to
deal with this dimension,
professional autonomy can include certain levels of free-
dom concerning moral matters related to the profession.
This is what we call ‘‘professional moral autonomy’’
(PMA).
Professional moral autonomy: its limits
and relevance
Dealing with moral questions is often part and parcel of a
profession. Scientists, for instance, have to manage con-
flicts of interest; bankers have to deal with questions of
responsible finance; farmers confront conflicts between
animal welfare and economic considerations. This, how-
ever, does not immediately explain the need for profes-
sional freedom concerning moral matters. To trace the
relevance of PMA it is helpful to specify its limits. We
identify at least three cases in which PMA does not play a
central role.
First, there are ethical questions that do not require any
moral freedom. For instance, professionals are not free in
answering the question whether or not to plagiarize in
science or whether a farmer needs to notify the authorities
about a zoonotic disease on his farm. On such topics there
is legislation that equally or even specifically holds for
professionals. Second, PMA is not at stake if the ethical
issue related to a profession belongs to the realm of private
morality. For instance, a professional can be free with
respect to the professional partners he chooses or the
friends he makes. However, this moral freedom is not
because it is entrusted to him as a professional. It is a
freedom one has as an individual citizen and that can be
used in one´s role as a professional.
Third, the notion of deliberately entrusting PMA appears
to be superfluous if issues related to a professional practice
are moral by nature, but do not lead to ethical problems.
For instance, we expect a medical doctor to be on time for
her consults and to deal with emergency cases. If these two
expectations conflict, she of course has freedom to assess
the situation at stake. However, it would be too strong a
claim to say that we deliberately entrust her with moral
autonomy to deal with problems of agenda setting in cases
of emergency even though principles of justice and
benevolence are at stake. In most Western societies we
commonly share the view that emergency cases have pri-
ority even if this implies that one has to cancel less urgent
consults and we expect the physician to act similarly.
Having sketched its limits, we can define when PMA is
relevant for professionals and for the public that has to rely
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on those professionals. This is the case if ethical issues
related to a profession:
(a) are on the public agenda,
(b) are not (yet) fully governed by laws, and
(c) lack a shared moral understanding in society.
Confronted with themes and questions that meet these
criteria PMA can be relevant. It is possible to be even more
precise by defining three situations in which PMA is rel-
evant. First, it is relevant if professionals have to deal with
ethical questions, but cannot have in-depth discussion with
society prior to their actual decisions. For instance, a vet-
erinarian working in a shelter makes moral decisions on a
daily basis, but she cannot always discuss her options at
full length as these decisions are often made under time
constraints. So a complete lack of freedom for professional
moral judgment would almost paralyze such a practice.
However, as a response one may argue that this situation
asks for a clear ethical code of conduct rather than for
entrusting professionals with moral autonomy. Although
having a professional code is a precondition for PMA (Carr
1999), no general rule can completely prescribe how a
professional should act. The well-known four principles of
biomedical ethics (Beauchamp and Childress 2001) are a
clear example. Even if we agree on, for instance, the
importance of the principle of benevolence, it is not self-
evident how a professional in a specific context should
interpret this principle. Professional practices ask for the
power of judgment in order to come to tailor-made inter-
pretations of ethical principles in the context of a specific
situation. In this context, PMA is essential as it provides
professionals with the room to specify the interpretation of
(broadly shared) principles for their practice.
Second, PMA can be relevant if discussions on ethical
questions are still open-ended. This open or on-going
character of the public debate can have different origins.
On the one hand, it might be the result of a generally
accepted plurality of views with respect to an ethical issue.
In that case PMA implies that professionals have the
freedom to operate within the field of existing and accepted
moral positions. This enables a medical doctor, for
instance, to deal with practical requests for cosmetic sur-
gery in spite of the diversity of views on the importance
and need of this kind of surgery. On the other hand, pro-
fessionals often operate in fields that are characterized by
innovation and transition. Consequently, the ethical prob-
lems are not restricted to questions of interpretation, but
also include genuine controversies or lacking clarity about
what principles are applicable and about the professionals’
responsibility. As a result, public debates are quite often
characterized by a plurality of conflicting or even mutually
exclusive views. For instance, the ethical dimensions
related to euthanasia, legal justice or animal welfare are
broadly recognized. Nonetheless, we often lack consensus
on the best way to address these issues. In those situations,
PMA is relevant. At this point, however, one could argue
that this asks for legislation rather than professional
autonomy. In the end this may be true. Nonetheless, if a
practice is characterized by profound moral plurality, then
formulating policy and legislation is not only difficult, it
also raises questions with regard to the legitimacy of the
legal framework. Therefore, next to or parallel to the pro-
cess of policy building it is important to focus on autonomy
in order to prevent that we end up with ‘‘ill-conceived
legislation’’ (cf. Rollin 2004, p. 964). This also shows that
professional moral autonomy can never be a blank check to
deal with controversial ethical issues. It is an indexed
freedom to explore various options that are available and
that are discussed in the public debate. This enables pro-
fessionals to contribute to the public debate by sharing
experiences and showing best practices. For instance, it can
imply pilot projects on data protection by ICT profes-
sionals or nanotechnology by scientists.
Finally, PMA is important if professionals have to act in
spite of the moral controversies. A veterinarian, for
example, is confronted with public opinion against unse-
dated castration of male piglets and with practical requests
of farmers on this issue. Therefore, some professional
autonomy is necessary to function as a professional. In this
way they can ‘‘determine the ways of thinking about
problems which fall in their domain’’ (Dingwall and Lewis
1983, p. 5).
The future of farming and the relevance of PMA
Having outlined the contexts in which professional moral
autonomy is relevant, we can focus on the applicability of
this concept for the practice of agriculture. We argued that
PMA is relevant if a profession is confronted with prob-
lems that have a public dimension, that are not (yet) fully
governed by law, and about which there is not (yet) a
shared moral understanding in society.
With regard to the first criterion, it is evident that
farming is linked to a number of public goods, such as food
security and safety, land use, spatial planning and nature
management. Consequently, farmers often are confronted
with questions that have a clear public dimension. Even
questions that seem to start on an individual farmer’s level
often have a public dimension. For example, a laying hen
farmer needs to make a decision whether or not to kill a
couple of hens that are ill and can easily be treated, but
even after treatment may be a small health risk to the
thousands of other hens. Even though the farmer’s choice is
on a private level, the options he has are immediately
framed by broader public themes on housing systems,
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animal welfare, the use of antibiotics and public health, and
the price of eggs.
Second, we argued that PMA is relevant if a profession
lacks sufficient guidance from a legal framework. With
regard to this condition it is less clear whether PMA is
relevant for the farming practice. Because of the public
importance of food security, food safety, and public health
there are already many laws and directives that guide
farming practice. For instance, if the farmer in the above-
mentioned example would like to use battery cages to
address the health risks, he is not allowed to use this
housing system in Europe because of the EU ban on battery
cages (EC 1999). Nonetheless, there still are themes that
are not fully governed by legal frameworks, such as animal
welfare, farming styles and the use of technologies.
This leads to the third condition that defines whether
PMA is relevant: the absence of a shared moral under-
standing in society. In farming there are quite a few themes
that meet this criterion. It is possible to distinguish between
two different categories. First, there are topics that are
essential to farming, but controversial in society, such as
the moral ideals on farming styles (conventional or
organic), the acceptability of dehorning cattle or the use of
antibiotics (cf. Cardoso and James 2012). Second, there are
discussions on topics that are relatively new for farming,
e.g., because technologies become available for agriculture
or because of new expectations and views on responsibil-
ities toward agriculture (e.g., with respect to water man-
agement and climate change). The plurality of views on the
role that technology should play in the future of animal
production is a good example. While some emphasize the
need to use new technologies, others stress the importance
of natural processes that should remain untouched by
technology. However, even those who agree on the general
importance of technology may differ profoundly in their
view on why technology is relevant. Some argue that
technology is necessary to make the current intensive
animal farming more sustainable. Others see technology as
the way to abandon animal production by searching for
alternative sources of protein, such as in vitro meat (Van
der Weele and Driessen 2013). The outcome of these dis-
cussions is still uncertain, as the ethical standards on a
number of topics are not yet set.
The discussion of the three conditions that define
whether PMA is relevant shows that, essentially, this
notion of autonomy is applicable to the practice of agri-
culture. It would however be too easy to claim that
therefore the individual farmer needs PMA. To make that
claim, it should be clear that farmers are worth to be
entrusted with professional autonomy in terms of room for
exploration.
Farmers and the conditions for entrusting PMA
The relevance of PMA in the context of agriculture is now
evident. The next question is whether farmers fulfill the
conditions for PMA. From the discussion on professions
and professionals, we distinguish three conditions. First,
PMA requires that the profession is related to the produc-
tion or distribution of a public service. Second, PMA
supposes that the professional has the moral competence
and expertise of the professional to deal with the public
dimension. Finally, there are procedural conditions, such as
the establishment of an ethical code of practice and a
certain level of organization and regulation.
The first question, then, is whether farming includes a
public service. The answer appears to be positive. Farming
has a long history of contributing to public goods such as
food, feed and soil, and more recently the management of
nature and water (e.g., Cooper, et al. 2009; Varley et al.
2009; Thompson 1990). This public dimension has also
been recognized by individual farmers (cf. De Rooij et al.
2010; De Lauwere and De Rooij 2010), by national farmer
associations (cf. LTO-Nederland 2009; NFU 2010), and by
governments all over Europe in policy on these topics. On
top of this, these public services are characterized by a
number of public ethical debates, such as on food pro-
duction, animal use, sustainable land use and nature
management.
The second question is related to the moral competence
and expertise of the professional. Whether farmers meet
this condition is less self-evident. If we start with the
farmers’ track record in contributing to ethical debates, the
evidence is not really convincing. At the same time, we
showed at the start of this paper that there are recent ini-
tiatives in the agricultural sector that show that farmers aim
to contribute to the public moral debate. In their commu-
nication they start to include ethical issues. For instance,
one of the Netherlands Farmers Associations stresses in its
vision document 2010–2020 that moral reflection on and a
reorientation on personal and public values is essential for
the members, the board and the staff of the association. To
function as farmers in the future, one of the farmer asso-
ciations argues, it is necessary to reflect ‘‘on what we really
think to be important, on our passions, and on what we aim
to contribute to the society. Answers in terms of technol-
ogy, management or finance alone no longer suffice’’
(ZLTO 2009, p. 3). Also initiatives in other countries (cf.
Deutschen Bauernverbandes 2011) illustrate that farmers
have, or at least are developing competence to deal with the
moral dimensions related to their profession. Furthermore,
the empirical research that underlies the present article
indicates that farmers have moral views that they aim to
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incorporate in their way of farming (De Rooij et al. 2010;
De Lauwere and De Rooij 2010; Meijboom 2009; Driessen
2014).
This leaves the third question: can farmers as profes-
sionals meet the procedural conditions, such as those
defined by Carr (1999)? These conditions are (a) the
establishment of an ethical code of practice and (b) a
certain level of organization and regulation for purposes of
(recruitment and) discipline. At this point, professional
organizations for farmers were traditionally focused on
promoting farmers’ economic interests. While veterinari-
ans and medical doctors since long have ethical codes,
farmers are not yet used to act according to general codes
of conduct. There certainly are (developments toward)
ethical codes and guidelines though, for instance those of
the Belgian Farmer Association (Boerenbond 2010; De
Winter 2004) and some breeding corporations in Europe
(De Weerd et al. 2012; Stafleu 2001; EFFAB 2014). These
organizations not only drafted a code, but a number of
them also established ethical committees. This indicates
that farmers are starting to acknowledge the new moral
dimension of their profession and are building the com-
petence to deal with them. However, in comparison to
other professions this is still on a minimal level and should
be further elaborated by, for instance, teaching, and an
improved institutional infrastructure in which attention to
ethics is embedded.
Nonetheless, we conclude that basically farmers can and
in some cases did meet the conditions to entrust them with
PMA. In the next section, we further specify this conclu-
sion, because it is important to differentiate between types
of farmers.
Types of farmers and the feasibility of PMA
In general terms we showed that farmers meet the condi-
tions to be entrusted with PMA. However, we need to add
some comment to this general point of view. Although all
farmers have to obey the law and have to adhere to an
ethical code, professionals have their own style. In the case
of farming these differences are relevant, because they
determine (a) whether a farmer needs PMA and
(b) whether he or she can be entrusted with moral auton-
omy. This section identifies and presents four types of
farmers. The distinction is based on in-depth interviews
with a large number of farmers (De Rooij et al. 2010,
pp. 344ff; De Lauwere and De Rooij 2010).
A first group consists of so-called ‘‘growth-orientated
entrepreneurs’’ who are strongly focused on production.
They emphasize the relevance of their profession on a
public level, e.g., with respect to food safety. However,
they do not recognize any ethical issues concerning this
production. They are convinced that public concerns with
respect to animal farming are rooted in ignorance, and will
be solved with better information. For this group of farmers
professional moral autonomy is irrelevant. On the one
hand, they do not fulfill the necessary conditions to be
entrusted with PMA. On the other hand, they do not need
autonomy on moral matters, because they do not recognize
the ethical dimension in issues, such as animal welfare of
nature management. For this group PMA will not be a
relevant tool that enables them to enter the public debate or
to empower them in public debates on ethical issues.
A second group consists of idealists who are quite aware
of the ethical dimensions of their work. Nonetheless, in
practice they are not faced with ethical problems because
they start from rather specific moral assumptions that
provide them with answers to most of the ethical questions.
For instance, they have quite outspoken ideas about the
acceptability of mutilations, such as castration or the use of
new technologies. Consequently, this group can be
entrusted with PMA in the sense that they have the com-
petence and experience to deal with ethical issues. How-
ever, it is questionable whether PMA is of any relevance
for this group. They do not need any professional freedom
to search for their position or deal with plurality. In this
sense it is not likely that professional autonomy will be
relevant for this group in order to be in a better position to
enter the discussion. It is quite likely that they already are
involved in public discussions on the ethical aspects of
animal farming.
Two other groups can be distinguished that linger in
between. They recognize that animal farming raises ethical
questions, but they do not (yet) have a clear and direct
answer to these questions. A first group consists of farmers
who try to ‘‘construct an equilibrium between animal
welfare and economic interests and prospects’’ (De Rooij
et al. 2010, p. 351). Another group focuses on dialogue and
open communication in order to deal with the public con-
cerns with respect to animal farming (p. 354). Especially
for these groups PMA is relevant. Farmers who can be
classified in these groups are aware of the moral dimen-
sions of their profession and have moral beliefs and con-
victions that appear to be broader than economic
considerations only. Consequently, they can be entrusted
with PMA. Furthermore, entrusting these types of farmers
with certain levels of freedom in order to deal with ethical
questions and problems related to (animal) farming is rel-
evant for the farmer. He or she can use this type of
autonomy to explore the available alternatives and to
manage the changing expectations toward agriculture as
professionals in a socially responsible way. For these types
of farmers PMA can be an incentive to enter the public
debate and to empower them in public debates on ethical
issues.
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PMA in practice
As a final step, it is now possible to explore what PMA for
farmers implies and what it requires in practice. To start
with the latter, PMA requires that farmers are aware that
any right or privilege linked to this freedom cannot be seen
independent from the duty to reflect on the moral dimen-
sions of agriculture and to act as trustworthy partners in
moral matters, i.e., as competent and adequately motivated
actors. This entails that farmers should act according to the
laws, regulations and society’s shared moral understand-
ings, but that they also have the competence of moral
judgment and discretionary powers to assess a situation if
we lack laws or are confronted with genuine moral
plurality.
In practice this implies that individual farmers and their
professional organizations have to formulate and use ethi-
cal codes of conduct that provide practical guidance for the
daily practice of farming. On the one hand, these codes
have to formulate the values farmers adhere to, e.g., care
for animals and the environment, and respect for autonomy
of citizens, colleagues and other stakeholders. Such values
may still be quite general. On the other hand, the code
needs to provide—based on the ethical values—more
practical principles and guidelines. For example, it trans-
lates the general concern for animal welfare to specific
requirements of daily care and inspection of animals. Such
a code should be considered as a precondition for PMA,
rather than as its replacement. It is a precondition because
an ethical code clarifies for farmers when freedom to
explore in moral matters is necessary. In addition, it is a
precondition because such a code helps to show farmers as
partners that can be entrusted with professional freedom.
Second, PMA requires that ethics is included in agricultural
educational programs of schools and (applied) universities.
These programs should provide knowledge of theories and
tools to recognize ethical problems, but also practical
training to deal with moral questions and public concerns.
Finally, attention to ethics should be embedded in the
infrastructure of farmers’ organizations. This may result in
the establishment of ethics committees, but can also be
translated in explicit attention to ethics during (annual)
meetings. These components contribute to the competence
to deal with moral questions, which is essential to work
with ethical codes and to actively use the moral autonomy.
To establish and implement ethical frameworks and
education in ethics is a task national or regional farmers
organizations should take seriously and not only in aspi-
rational, but also in operational terms. If they do so,
farmers become trustworthy partners in ethical issues and
can be entrusted with PMA. This can be relevant for both
farmers and society. First, it can increase efficiency in
cases that are controversial. For instance, moral autonomy
with regard to the dehorning of cattle is important as long
as there is no clear consensus in society. If farmers would
lack any moral freedom in those cases, they run the risk
that their profession gets paralyzed if self-regulation is
replaced by ill-conceived laws. Thus, this freedom can be
essential for farmers. However, this self-regulation is rel-
evant for society as well, because PMA comes with a
responsibility for farmers to reflect on the normative issue
at stake. In this case it implies ethical reflection on
dehorning and the responsibility to use this freedom to find
(new) ways to cope with the conflicting views on such a
topic, e.g., by exploring the alternatives in terms of housing
systems or breeding strategies.
This latter point is related to a second way in which
PMA works in practice. It can make farmers’ experience
operational. Farmers have direct and hands-on experience
with a number of issues that are publicly debated, such as
animal welfare, land use or water management. This
experience (in combination with the condition of moral
competence) can serve as input to the public debate that
other stakeholders cannot easily provide. Furthermore,
PMA can be useful to explore and test ideas and innova-
tions that follow from public debates. For instance, farmers
can play an essential role in exploring ways to improve
animal welfare and weigh this value against other values,
such as public health, environmental values and eco-
nomics. In practice this may result in room for the farmer
to explore new housing systems, or feeding or breeding
strategies. Furthermore, the room to explore can be used as
a first step before a large-scale introduction of new tech-
nologies or in the process of drafting policies and
regulations.
Finally, PMA for farmers is relevant in order to clarify
and deal with mutual expectations between farmers and
society. As mentioned above, the position of and expec-
tations toward farmers are changing and are not univocal. It
is evident that people expect agriculture to be carried out in
an environmentally friendly manner and that parts of
society consider farmers as romanticized guardians of the
countryside (Mcelwee and Annibal 2010; Dundon 2003).
At the same time, farmers are still expected to produce
sufficient and safe food in an economically viable way. In
addition, the scope of the tasks of agriculture is broadened
and can include nature management and water manage-
ment, the so-called green and blue values of agriculture
(SER 2008).
In this context PMA gives farmers the tools to find a
balance between accommodation and integrity. Accom-
modation implies that the farmer should be open to the
plurality of moral expectations and should be prepared to
change his view, and be willing to actively search for new
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ways to deal with the conflicting expectations. PMA can
help in these cases to formulate legitimate reasons for the
decision whether or not to comply with the expectation of
society. This is directly linked to having integrity. Integrity
understood as a sincere commitment of the farmer to
‘‘those projects and principles which are constitutive of
one’s core identity’’ or with the tasks and aims that are
constitutive for agriculture, leads to constraints on the
demand of accommodation in a way that make choices not
arbitrary. The choices farmers make, based on their pro-
fessional autonomy, are not beyond debate, but they are
well considered choices, and the farmer can give legitimate
reasons for the decision whether or not to act in the
expected way. Consequently, not everyone in society will
agree with farmers, but the profession can be trustworthy
despite the confrontation with the changing and conflicting
moral expectations (Meijboom 2008).
In sum, PMA can in practice contribute to the efficiency
of farmers, helps to make their moral experience opera-
tional in the public debate, provides room to explore the
feasibility of ideas from public debate, and is a tool to
clarify mutual expectations and deal with conflicting
expectations.
Conclusion
We conclude that the relevance of professional moral
autonomy arises from the combination of three elements.
First, the increasing distance in time and space between
consumer and farmer, which implies that society has to rely
on farmers in many matters of agriculture because they
lack the expertise and time to control all activities in the
agro-food sector. Second, the presence of a number of
ethical issues on the public agenda that are not (yet) gov-
erned by laws and lack a shared moral understanding in
society. Third, we have clear indications that farmers have
moral beliefs and values that enable them to contribute to
the public debate in a relevant way and that they increas-
ingly are willing to contribute to the debate on, for
instance, animal welfare, nature management or sustain-
able food production. Consequently, it can be possible and
relevant to entrust farmers with professional freedom in
moral matters.
However, we also discussed that PMA can only be
entrusted if the professional meets certain conditions. From
this perspective, we have to conclude that farmers and their
professional organizations have already taken steps, but
still have to make further progress in order to gain suffi-
cient competence and experience to deal with the ethical
dimensions of their profession. This implies that they have
to establish and implement ethical frameworks, address
ethical issues in their education programs, and further
embed attention to ethics in their professional organization.
This is a task national or regional farmers’ organizations
should take seriously and not only in aspirational, but also
in operational terms. In addition, we have to sound one
note of caution: for the so-called growth-orientated entre-
preneurs, who are strongly focused on production (De
Rooij et al. 2010), PMA will not be a useful concept. This
is mainly because they are not aware of the moral dimen-
sions of the public issues related to agriculture.
These conditions show that PMA never implies a blank
check with respect to moral matters in general. It is always a
matter of entrusting professionals in well-delineated cases
based on their professional moral beliefs and values, expe-
rience and competence. Furthermore, the analysis shows that
the discussed conditions are necessary, but not sufficient
conditions to entrust moral autonomy to professionals. The
autonomy is entrusted by society, a profession cannot
enforce it. Nonetheless, a profession can prove society that
they areworthy of the autonomy and can show that entrusting
PMA is of mutual relevance and benefit in a specific case.
If farmers meet these necessary conditions and thereby
prove themselves as trustworthy partners in ethical issues,
society has reasons to entrust them with PMA. In practice,
this implies that PMA can increase the efficiency of
farmers, because they can run their farms in spite of the
ongoing debates. Second, it helps to makes their moral
experience operational in the public debate, provides room
to explore the feasibility of ideas from public debate.
Farmers can, for instance, play an important role in
exploring ways to deal with questions of nature manage-
ment in rural areas. Finally, it is a tool to clarify mutual
expectations and deal with conflicting expectations.
We conclude that professional moral autonomy is rele-
vant for those farmers who recognize the moral dimension
of farming, but are still looking for legitimate moral
answers to the public questions related to their profession.
Entrusting them with PMA gives an impetus to the search
for innovative answers to the ethical questions raised by
agriculture. Rather than emphasizing that they lack clear
answers, entrusting them with freedom to explore ideas and
to make innovations operational contributes to a joint
search for ethical answers. In this way the public and the
farmers, the agricultural professionals, can strengthen each
other.
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